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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
NASH V. STATE: JURY NOTE EXPRESSING CONCERN 
ABOUT MOTIVES BEHIND A JUROROR URY NOTE 
EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT MOTIVES BEHIND A 
JURORORSUMPTION OF PREJUDICE REQUIRING VOIR 
DIRE SUA SPONTE.     
 
By: Nadya Cheatham 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a note from a jury, containing 
allegations that a juror would change her original voting position if it meant 
she could go home earlier, did not raise a presumption of prejudice and 
therefore did not require the trial judge to conduct voir dire sua sponte.  Nash 
v. State, 439 Md. 53, 94 A.3d 23 (2014).  Additionally, the court held that the 
trial judge did not abuse her discretion when she chose to release the jurors 
and remind them of their duties under oath, rather than directly assuring the 
impartiality of the jurors.  Id.  The court further held that there was no abuse 
of discretion in the trial courtn when she chose to release thAllen instruction.  
Id.  Furthermore, the court held that the trial judgediscretion in the trial 
courtn when she choiolate Maryland Rule 4-326(d).  Id.      
     On December 17, 2009, Troy Nash (t the trial judgediscretion in the trial 
courtn when she choiolate Maryland Rule 4-326(d).  ind them of their duties 
uꀀdays of trial, the jury spent approximately six to seven hours each day in 
the courthouse.  On the fourth day of trial, the judge received a note from the 
jury foreman (the when she choiolate Maryland Rule 4-326(d).  ind thegness 
to change her original vote of e received a not“ess to change her original vote 
of eme and not return.  The judge immediately read the Note to counsel for 
both parties and Nash subsequently moved for a mistrial.   
     Rather than granting the request for mistrial, the judge chose to release 
the jury for the three-day weekend, advising them to return on the following 
Tuesday morning to continue their deliberations.  The court also issued 
additional instructions to the jury to not discuss the case with anyone and to 
not do any independent research relating to the case.  Nash requested that the 
court give a modified Allen charge, however, the court denied this request.    
     On September 6, 2011, the trial resumed.  After approximately one hour 
of deliberations, the jury found Nash guilty of first degree murder.  Nash 
again renewed his motion for a mistrial and stated his intent to file a motion 
for a new trial.  The court reserved ruling on the motion for a mistrial and 
scheduled a hearing for the motion for a new trial.  
     On October 28, 2011, a hearing was held on Nasht to filn for a new trial, 
where the court denied both the motion for mistrial and new trial.  On appeal, 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the lower courttion for a 
mistrial and scheduled a hearing for the motion for a new trial. hich the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted.  
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      The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by examining the 
standard of review for a motion for mistrial.  Nash, 439 Md. at 66, 94 A.3d at 
31.  Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial judge is given wide 
discretion in making a decision, and such decision should not be overruled 
simply because the appellate court would not have come to the same 
conclusion.  Id. at 67, 94 A.3d at 31.  
     The court then examined whether the trial judge had a duty to conduct 
voir dire sua sponte, prior to ruling on Nashtrial judge-53 (2012)).  Nash, 
439 Md. 69-70, 94 A.3d at 33.  When a motion for mistrial is based on juror 
misconduct, a trial judge is required to conduct voir dire sua sponte in two 
circumstances:  (1) when the juror misconduct is egregious and raises a 
presumption of prejudice, which must be rebutted before the motion can be 
denied, and (2) when a relevant and material fact, regarding the juror2) 
whenres, is unknown to the court and must be determined before the trial 
judge has ‘sufficient information to determine whether the presumption of 
prejudice attached to the alleged misconduct.  Id. at 69, 94 A.3d at 32 
(quoting Dillard v. State, 415 Md. 445, 457, 3 A.3d at 403, 410 (2010)).  
Despite these two, limited, circumstances, Nash proposed that the court 
recognize a third circumstance, in which the absence of voir dire by the trial 
judge constituted reversible error for failing to receive the jurors eassurance 
that they could render a fair and impartial verdict.  Nash, 439 Md. at 69-70, 
94 A.3d at 32-33.   
     The court ultimately held that the presumption of prejudice did not apply 
to the case sub judice for two main reasons.  Nash, 439 Md. at 76-77, 94 
A.3d at 37.  First, the court determined that the Note constituted “otenti 
misconduct,” rather than actual misconduct.  Id. at 77, 94 A.3d at 37.  The 
court explained that in cases where the juror misconduct has already 
occurred, the trial judge is limited to the use of voir dire to attempt to cure 
any prejudice that resulted from the misconduct. Id.  Here, because the 
Subject Juror never acted on the alleged statement, the trial judge had the 
capability of preventing any prejudice from actually occurring to Nash.  Id.  
Second, the court found that the statement made by the Subject Juror did not 
concern any of the evidence or witnesses in the case, and therefore, did not e, 
e concern  thaof deliberations,” as juror contact to a witness, party to the case 
or third party would.  Id.  The court further noted that because the 
presumption of prejudice did not apply, Nash carried the burden to request 
voir dire to obtain assurance of impartiality from the jury.  Id. at 79, 94 A.3d 
at 38.  
     The court then addressed NashNash had carthat the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to conduct voir dire to obtain sufficient information 
about the juror misconduct, prior to ruling on the motion for mistrial.  Nash, 
439 Md. at 80, 94 A.3d at 39.  When a party moves for a mistrial based on 
alleged juror misconduct, but fails to request voir dire, the trial judge must 
conduct voir dire sua sponte if he or she lacks sufficient factual information 
regarding the jurorfficient  , which is needed to determine whether a 
presumption of prejudice arises or whether a motion for mistrial should be 
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denied.  Id. at 84, 94 A.3d at 41.  The court held that the trial judge had 
sufficient facts to rule on the motion for mistrial because the few facts that 
were left unresolved did not concern factual information that was ‘of central 
importance to what the jury ultimately had to decide’ in deliberations.  Id. at 
85, 94 A.3d at 42 (quoting Johnson v. State, 423 Md. 137, 153, 31 A.3d 239, 
249 (2011)).  
     The court then turned to Nash’s next challenge that the trial judge abused 
her discretion in failing to receive assurances from the jury that the verdict 
would be fair and impartial, prior to ruling on the motion for mistrial.  Nash, 
439 Md. at 86, 94 A.3d at 42.  The court reemphasized the flexibility in the 
abuse of discretion standard, which grants the trial judge a wide range of 
discretion in ensuring fairness and impartiality of the jury.  Id.  The court 
found that the trial judge had more than one h grants the dence to rule on the 
motion.   deliberatio, and stated that it was not the court’s job to weigh which 
option is better.  Id. at 86-87, 94 A.3d at 43.  Additionally, the court held that 
the trial judge did not abuse her discretion when she decided to release the 
jurors for the weekend, with curative instructions, rather than directly 
assessing the jury’s impartiality.  Id. at 87, 94 A.3d at 43.   
    Furthermore, the court held that the trial judge did not err in denying 
Nashas not founto give the jury a modified Allen charge.  Nash, 439 Md. at 
94, 94 A.3d at 47.  The court stated that although an Allen charge had been 
allowed in at least one context that was not deadlock, it did not follow that 
the trial court erred when it refused to automatically apply it to yet another 
context.  Id. at 92-93, 94 A.3d at 46 (citing Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139, 310 
A.2d 538 (1973)).  Finally, the court held that the trial judge has the ultimate 
discretion in deciding whether to give an Allen charge. Id. at 94, 94 A.3d at 
47.   
     The court further rejected Nash’s position that the trial judge violated 
Maryland Rule 4-326(d), based on the judgesition that thto the jury note.  
Nash, 439 Md. at 96, 94 A.3d at 48.  The court determined that the trial 
judge’s response, excusing the jurors for the three-day weekend and 
reminding them to remain impartial, was consistent with the plain language 
of the rule.  Id.  Furthermore, the contents of the Note “did not pose a 
question from the jury regarding applicable law that required specific 
clarification,”  rather, the trial judge surmised the Note to be a result of juror 
fatigue and frustration.  Id. at 96, 94 A.3d at 48 (quoting State v. Baby, 404 
Md. 220, 263, 946 A.2d 463, 488 (2008)). 
     The dissent argued that the trial judge should have conducted further 
inquiry into the note before denying the mistrial.  Nash, 439 Md. at 98, 94 
A.3d at 49 (McDonald, J., dissenting).  The dissent also argued that the 
majoritynducted furtheiated from its previous decisions, where further 
inquiry was conducted under circumstances where the juror misconduct was 
not as substantial and “central to the decision-making process” as the case 
sub judice.  Id. at 97, 94 A.3d at 49 (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
     In Nash, the Court of Appeals found that a note from the jury alleging 
juror misconduct was insufficient to generate any presumption of prejudice, 
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and thus did not require the trial judge to conduct voir dire sua sponte.  
Although Maryland courts are reluctant to grant mistrials for every allegation 
of juror misconduct, practitioners should be mindful of the courts’ continual 
efforts to achieve a balance between judicial economy and preserving a 
defendant’s due process rights within the criminal justice system.  
Interestingly, the Nash majority expressed concern that the Note was 
troublesome, but still found that it was not egregious enough to prejudice the 
defendant.  Going forward, the court will need to offer more guidance on a 
bright line rule regarding the degree of egregious juror misconduct needed to 
overcome the defendant of egregious juror misconduct  
 
 
